William of Ockham, a prominent medieval philosopher, was deeply engaged in the philosophical inquiry of the problem of erring animals. This inquiry was not only a question of understanding the nature of human intellect, but also the possibility of nonhuman animals possessing some form of mental cognition that could lead to errors. The 14th-century scholastic thinkers, including Ockham, Adam Wodeham, and Gregory of Rimini, were grappling with the complexities of these issues within the established scholastic orthodoxy that posited humans as the only animals endowed with an intellect or rational soul.
The problem of erring animals presented a significant philosophical challenge. It required the medieval philosophers to reconcile their understanding of human intellect with the empirical observation that nonhuman animals also seemed to make mistakes. This led to a question of whether nonhuman animals could be considered to be performing acts of the intellect, despite lacking a rational soul.
Ockham and his contemporaries sought to answer these questions in a manner that would maintain the scholastic orthodoxy that humans are distinct from other animals in possessing an intellect. They approached the problem of erring by suggesting that the nature of error is an act of the intellect. This led to a tentative acknowledgment of nonhuman animals making errors, but they also contended that these errors were fundamentally different from human intellectual errors. They argued that while nonhuman animals might exhibit behavior that appears to be akin to intellectual activity, their actions are not the result of a rational soul, but rather are the result of instinct, habit, or other non-rational factors.
The medieval debate on erring animals reflects the underlying structure of many contemporary discussions on nonhuman minds. The challenge to basic assumptions about the nature of intelligence and cognition in animals continues to be a source of contention. This debate highlights the difficulty in inferring the inner workings of nonhuman minds, particularly when dealing with entities that lack a rational soul as traditionally understood within the Western philosophical tradition.
In modern times, the problem of erring animals is akin to the broader inquiry into the nature of nonhuman minds, challenging our assumptions about intelligence, cognition, and the possibility of error in beings that are not human. The medieval philosophers’ efforts to navigate this complex issue, while maintaining the integrity of scholastic orthodoxy, provide a historical precedent for contemporary debates on nonhuman minds.
Views: 0